Trading rose across most comparable venues
These are tracked on-chain DEX venues. Prediction markets, trading apps and overlapping router totals are separate. Gross trading does not tell us how many people traded or whether buyers added net money.
The largest fifteen are shown below; each share uses all 775 tracked venues, not just these rows. A busy venue may still have thin liquidity or repeated trading.
6 of six selected networks returned readings. Shares compare only these network rows and the same tracked DEX list, not the whole market. Daily change compares venues present on both days. Incomplete longer totals stay unavailable.
Uniswap V3 supplies 16.0% of all tracked daily trading. Without it, the remaining venues record $8.5B. That is the amount left after removing the leader, not an estimate of fresh money.
Selected past incidents show why the exact product matters. These are historical records, not a list of currently vulnerable pools or a complete incident history.
A compromised administrator account allowed funds to be taken from eight pools. Raydium said its concentrated-liquidity pools and staking programs were not affected by this incident. Administrative control was the problem; trading activity would not have exposed it.
Read Raydium’s incident account ↗The exploit affected Elastic’s pool accounting. That is a different product from the aggregator that finds routes across exchanges. An incident attached to one product must not become a claim about every product under its name.
Read KyberSwap’s incident account ↗The incident affected particular Composable Stable Pools in V2. Balancer’s account says V3 was not affected by this attack. A shared brand does not mean shared vulnerable code.
Read Balancer’s incident account ↗These incidents are not automatically assigned to token-search results. That requires the same network, deployed contract and affected version.
Decentralised exchanges introduce different questions: who can change the code, whether a pool can handle your trade, and what a past exploit affected. Trading volume cannot answer those questions.
Did an incident affect this deployed version, a different pool, the website or a connected bridge? The name alone is not enough.
How far would your trade move the price? Total pool value can look large while the usable liquidity is small.
Can someone upgrade the contract, pause withdrawals or alter fees? A code review does not remove those powers.
Was the fault fixed, was a new contract deployed and were users repaid? An old exploit and an unresolved exploit mean different things.
This page currently measures trading and pool readings. It does not publish an exploit-clearance or contract-safety score.
Choose the network and paste the complete contract address. The result compares returned markets by price, gross trading and available liquidity. Transactions are not wallets, and gross trading is not net money.
Research by Ananda Banerjee for Charlie Quant Lab · Updated